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HOULTON CITIZENS' COALITION V. TOWN OF HOULTON:
IS AN "OPEN AND COMPETITIVE" BIDDING PROCESS
REALLY THE SOLUTION TO NATIONAL
WASTE DISPOSAL PROBLEMS?
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States is the world's leading producer of garbage.1
The United States produces approximately 222 million tons of mu-
nicipal solid waste every year.2 Municipalities throughout the coun-
try deposit most of this solid waste in landfills.
3
However, municipalities are quickly depleting existing landfill
space and are creating a "waste crisis". 4 Eighty percent of landfills
that operated in 1989 will fill to capacity and close by the year
2004.5 As these landfills close, no new waste disposal sites replace
1. See Sidney M. Wolf, The Solid Waste Crisis: Flow Control and the Commerce
Clause, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 529, 530 (1994) (stating, "Americans produce more
garbage, both per person and in absolute amounts, than any other nation in the
world").
2. See Robert R.M. Verchick, Critical Space Theory: Keeping Local Geography in
American and European Environmental Law, 73 TUL. L. REv. 739, 750 (1999); see also
The Math: Behold the Universal Power of the Number, For Him Magazine, Mar./Apr.
2000, at 54. The United States produces one-fifth of the world's garbage. See id.
Individually, the average American generates 1,570 pounds of garbage per year. See
id.
3. See James E. Breitenbucher, Yakety Yak, Take Your Garbage Back: Do States
Have Any Protection From Becoming The Dumping Grounds For Out-Of-State Municipal
Solid Waste?, 52 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 225, 225-26 (1997) (stating inciner-
ation and recycling are other disposal methods but majority of waste goes to land-
fill); see also City of Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617, 630 (1978) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (asserting environmental problems linked to incineration has led to
decline in that method of waste disposal); Public Ownership of Dumps is the Key,
Rachel's Hazardous Waste News # 232: March 8, 2000, available at http://
rachel.enviroweb.org/rhwn232.htm (noting Americans bury 134 million tons of
municipal solid waste in landfills every year).
4. See Jennifer M. Anglim, The Need For A Rational State and Local Response to
Carbone: Alternate Means to Responsible, Affordable Municipal Solid Waste Management,
18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 129, 130 (1999) (defining "waste crisis" as "a term commonly
used to describe the vast quantity of garbage produced in the United States each
year in the face of closing landfills"); Erik T. Koons, Note, Without A Clue And Still
Without A Master Plan: Municipalities Left Uncertain How To Manage Waste Disposal
Crisis In Wake Of Third Circuit Decision In Harvey & Harvey, Inc. V. County of Chester, 9
VILL. EuvrL. L.J. 225, 226 (1998).
5. See Koons, supra note 4, at 226. Congress has not provided state or munici-
pal governments with the tools needed to address this "waste crisis" and as result,
state and local governments have assumed the responsibility of instituting waste
management programs and dealing with the financial burdens that come with it.
See id. at 227-28.
(393)
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them.6 Therefore, the supply of waste disposal sites will not meet
the demand of increased amounts of municipal waste. 7
One explanation for this crisis is that many communities do
not want to deposit waste within their borders because of potential
public health concerns.8 Landfills may leak hazardous substances
into the soil or groundwater. 9 Similarly, incinerators may emit tox-
ins into the air. 10
As a result, environmental concerns push many states to adopt
stricter waste disposal regulations.1 Sanctions imposed pursuant to
these regulations have forced states to close many landfills and have
increased disposal rates. 12 The cost of constructing new disposal fa-
cilities to replace these closed sites can cost millions.13
Communities handle the high costs associated with waste dis-
posal in different ways. Many communities ship their solid waste to
landfills located in other states, but recipients of this outside waste
6. See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Re-
sources, 504 U.S. 353, 368-69 (1992) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated that the amount of solid waste is supposed to reach 216 million
tons by the year 2000, or 4.4 pounds per person per day. See id. at 368 (citing
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Characterization of Municipal Solid Waste in
the United States 1990 Update, 1990 Update 10 (1990)). Chief Justice Rehnquist as-
serted that the capacity to dispose of solid waste has not grown to meet demand
because of the "substantial risks attendant to waste sites make them extraordinarily
unattractive neighbors." Id. at 369.
7. See id.
8. See Breitenbucher, supra note 3, at 226 (commenting that landfills are un-
popular because they create problems for local communities, such as contamina-
tion of local groundwater and high financial costs due to stricter environmental
regulations).
9. See Verchick, supra note 2, at 750-51 (stating that in addition to these poten-
tially hazards of waste disposal sites "these facilities bring increased noise, odors,
traffic, and other annoyances to surrounding communities"); see also Hazardous
and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3226 (1984)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. 6901 (1994)). "[I]nadequate and environmentally unsound
practices for the disposal or use of solid waste have created greater amounts of air
and water pollution and other problems for the environment and for health" 42
U.S.C. § 6901 (b) (3).
10. See Verchick, supra note 2, at 750-51.
11. See Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. Town of Chester, 68 F.3d 788, 791 (3d Cir.
1995).
12. See id.; William E. Ward, EPA Adopts New Guidelines for Landfill Gas Emis-
sions: An Additional Regulation Impacting Landfills Operating In Utah, 17 J. LAND RE-
SOURCES & ENVrL. L. 435, 440 (1997) (noting the number of landfills decreased
from 20,000 to 6,000 between 1978 and 1988).
13. See Wolf, supra note 1, at 537 (stating construction and operation of new
waste facilities is enormously expensive); see also Sidney M. Wolf, Congressional
Bailout of Flow Control. Saving the Burning Beast, 7 ViLn. ENVrL. L.J. 263, 267
(1996) (stating that "a state-of-the-art landfill can easily cost $150 million to con-
struct" while "[w]aste-to-energy incinerators cost from $30 million to $500 million
to build").
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often protest.' 4 Many of these recipient communities attempt to en-
act provisions that block or restrict waste importation.' 5 Courts,
however, have struck down these provisions under the Constitu-
tion's dormant Commerce Clause.1 6
Other communities address the rising cost of waste disposal by
increasing local municipal ownership in the waste disposal busi-
ness.' 7 However, municipalities put themselves at risk by taking
ownership in waste disposal sites.1 8 Financing for public projects
such as these costs millions of dollars.1 9 As a result, many communi-
ties must incur a sizeable amount of debt.20 To alleviate the fiscal
14. See Breitenbucher, supra note 3, at 227 (asserting waste disposal to other
communities turns local problem into someone else's problem); Verchick, supra
note 2, at 750 (stating fifteen million tons of waste is transported across state lines
each year "and the trend appears to be rising dramatically"); see also Paul
Schwarztman, N.Y.C. Garbage A Mixed Bag, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Jan. 25, 1999, at 19.
Bruce Weisburn, a resident and chairman for the local board of trustees for the
town of Waynesburg, Ohio, which is a recipient of New York City trash, stated that
"enough is enough. We don't want anymore... [i]t smells like New York City
here." Id.
15. See Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992) (in-
volving state tax on importation of waste into Alabama); City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (involving state ban on imported waste).
16. See id.; see also Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality,
511 U.S. 93 (1994) (holding surcharge on out of state waste unconstitutional under
Commerce Clause); Chemical Waste Management, 504 U.S. 334 (holding additional
fee of seventy-two dollars per ton on waste generated out of state violated Com-
merce Clause); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural
Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992) (holding Michigan solid waste management statute
which prohibited private landfill operators from accepting solid waste from outside
that operator's county as violation of Commerce Clause); City of Philadelphia, 437
U.S. at 618 (striking down New Jersey statute that "prohibits the importation of
most 'solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial
limits of the State .. . .'" as violation of Commerce Clause).
17. See Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of Chester, 68 F.3d 788, 791 (3d Cir.
1995). The court stated that prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, most waste dis-
posal facilities were privately owned. See id. After the Tax Reform Act repealed
many tax incentives and private costs increased due to increased environmental
regulation, public ownership became necessary. See id.
18. See id.; see also Nelson Perez, The Unconstitutionality of Waste Flow Control and
the Environmental Justice Movement's Impact on Incinerators, 22 RUTGERS COMP. &
TECH. L.J. 587, 594 (1996) (asserting flow control ordinances are crucial to prevent
debt service defaults of municipal bonds, since investors "rely on flow control guar-
antees when investing in capital intensive technology"). For a discussion of how a
flow control ordinance works, see text accompanying infra notes 21-24.
19. See Koons, supra note 4, at 232-33 (stating municipalities have had to issue
millions of dollars in bonds to finance waste facility construction).
20. See id.; Sidney M. Wolf, Congressional Bailout of Flow Control: Saving the Burn-
ing Beast, 7 ViIu. ENVTL. L.J. 263, 272 (1996) (noting "vulnerable debts range from
a $17.9 million materials recovery facility in Springfield, Missouri, to $46 million
borrowed for a proposed sewage sludge composting facility in Burlington County,
New Jersey, to $180 million in bond borrowing for a waste-to-energy plant in On-
ondaga County, New York"); C.M.A. McCauliff, The Environment Held In Trust For
Future Generations or the Dormant Commerce Clause Held Hostage To The Invisible Hand
2000]
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risk related to constructing and managing waste disposal sites, many
communities enact flow control ordinances that create a system to
direct municipally-licensed haulers to haul garbage to certain
county-designated landfills.21 Once at the landfill, haulers are
charged a "tipping fee".2 2 A "tipping fee" is a monetary amount
based upon the facility's construction cost and the estimated
amount of deposited waste per annum.23 By conditioning a haulers
license on compliance with this system, a municipality can enable
itself to cover the construction and operation costs of these facili-
ties.24 However, the United States Supreme Court and other circuit
courts have consistently invalidated flow control ordinances which
"deprive competitors, including out-of-state firms, of access to a lo-
cal market" as unconstitutional violations of the dormant Com-
merce Clause. 25
This Casenote addresses the recent decision of the First Circuit
Court of Appeals in Houlton Citizens' Coalition v. Town of Houlton,26
in which the Court upheld the Town of Houlton's flow control or-
dinance against a dormant Commerce Clause attack. Part II dis-
cusses the facts of Houlton.27 Part III provides a background of the
dormant Commerce Clause and an analysis of various courts' inter-
Of The Market?, 40 VL. L. REv. 645, 651 n.17 (1995) (noting that there is eighteen
billion dollars of debt, including municipal bonds, invested in waste management
field) (citing 140 Cong. Rec. HI10, 307 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1994)).
21. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 792. A haulers' license is usually conditioned upon
compliance with the flow control ordinance. See id.; see also Wolf, supra note 1, at
537. Wolf states that "without flow control measures these facilities would not have
predictable volume nor would waste generating sources have predictable disposal
capacity." Id.
22. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 792.
23. See id. ; C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 387
(financing newly built transfer station required minimum of 126,000 tons of waste
per year and a "tipping fee" of eight-one dollars per ton). For a discussion of the
facts and holding in Carbone, see infra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
24. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 792. The Third Circuit in Harvey noted that the
waste disposal crisis led to higher tipping fees in years past because there was more
demand than supply. See id. at f.4. However, the waste disposal market adjusted to
this with an emergence of new entrants. See id. As a result, tipping fees fell. See id.
Therefore, "flow control ordinances have been crucial to the financial viability of
these facilities." Id.
25. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 386. For a discussion of Carbone, see infra notes 75-86
and accompanying text. See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of
Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992); SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown, 66 F.3d
502, 513-14 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding ordinance excluded in and out-of-state com-
petitors thereby violating dormant Commerce Clause); Ben Oehrleins and Sons
and Daughter, Inc. v. Hennepin County, 115 F.3d 1372, 1385 (holding ordinance
giving preference to local interests violated Commerce Clause).
26. 175 F.3d 178, 181 (1st Cir. 1999).
27. For a discussion of the facts of Houlton, see supra notes 31-46 and accom-
panying text.
4
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pretations of the clause. 28 Part IV includes both a narrative and crit-
ical analysis of the First Circuit's decision.2 9 Finally, Part V attempts
to gauge the impact that this decision will have on other cases
throughout the judicial system.30
II. FACTS
On October 17, 1995, state environmental authorities ordered
the Town of Houlton (the Town) to close its dump.3 1 To remain
compliant with state law, the Town conducted an open competitive
bidding process by issuing a Request for Proposals (RFP).32 The
Town selected a local firm, Andino, Inc. (Andino) as its exclusive
waste management contractor. 33 The Town also enacted a flow-con-
trol ordinance (the 1995 Ordinance).34 However, another trash dis-
posal operator challenged the 1995 Ordinance in federal court.35 '
To avoid litigation, the Town chose to enact a new ordinance (the
1997 Ordinance).36
28. For a discussion of the background and interpretation of the dormant
Commerce Clause, see supra notes 47-127 and accompanying text.
29. For a discussion of the narrative and critical analysis, see supra notes 128-
90 and accompanying text.
30. For a discussion of Houlton's impact, see supra notes 191-209 and accompa-
nying text.
31. See Houlton, 175 F.3d at 181.
32. See id.
33. See id. The Town agreed to provide Andino with a guaranteed trash quota
for seven years. See id.
34. See id. The 1995 Ordinance "required all residential solid waste generated
within the town limits to be taken to a local transfer site operated by Andino." Id.;
see also HOULTON, MAINE, SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT REGULATIONS, art. V, § 10-504
(1995). The 1995 Ordinance states:
the town or the contractor of the town shall designate any exclusive dis-
posal site or sites for disposal of solid wastes generated within the bounda-
ries of the town. The disposal of the solid waste generated within the
town by any waste generator at any place other than at the disposal site(s)
is prohibited.
Id.
35. See Houlton, 175 F.3d at 181. David Condon, a trash disposal operator,
sued Andino and the Town "[a]sserting that the 1995 Ordinance violated the
Commerce Clause . . . ." Id. A federal district court upon hearing the complaint
preliminarily enjoined the 1995 Ordinance. See id.; see also Condon v. Andino, Inc.,
961 F.Supp. 323 (D. Me. 1997) (providing district court's full opinion).
36. See Houlton, 175 F.3d at 181. The 1997 Ordinance provided in pertinent
part the following:
Town residents who do not use the residential refuse collection services
of the Town or its franchisee or contractor shall dispose of their residen-
tial refuse at the disposal site designated by the Town Council. The dispo-
sal of residential refuse generated within the Town by any waste
generator at any place other than at the disposal site designated by the
Town Council is prohibited unless the refuse has been collected by the
20001
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The 1997 Ordinance has two components. 3 7 The first compo-
nent "requires all generators of residential rubbish within the Town
either to use Houlton's chosen contractor to transport their trash,
or to haul it themselves."38 Residents who choose to self-haul must
take their refuse to a repository designated by the Town Council.3 9
Those who fail to comply with the ordinance are subject to fines
and penalties. 40 The second component, the Town's new contract
with Andino, gives Andino "the exclusive right to collect third-party
residential waste under the 1997 Ordinance, and designat[es] its
transfer station as the disposal site for self-haulers." 41
The Houlton Citizens' Coalition (HCC),42 along with three
other plaintiffs, brought suit in the United States District Court for
the District of Maine to restrain the implementation of the 1997
Ordinance. 43 The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the Town on all claims.44
HCC appealed to the First Circuit, arguing that the 1997 Ordi-
nance violated the Commerce, Takings, and Contract Clauses of
the United States Constitution.45 After reviewing the case, the First
Town or its contractor, in which case it may be disposed of at any disposal
site.
Houlton, MAINE, SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT REGULATIONS, art. V, § 10-504 (1997).
37. See Houlton, 175 F.3d at 181.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 181-82. However, "the Town's contractor is permitted to dispose
of collected trash at any proper disposal site." Id.
40. See id. at 182.
41. Id. The 1995 contract between Andino and the Town included a failsafe
clause which stated that the Town would "agree to negotiate with Andino in good
faith to keep it as the Town's contractor if a court of competent jurisdiction held
the 1995 Ordinance invalid or unenforceable." Id.
42. The Houlton Citizens' Coalition is an "unincorporated nonprofit associa-
tion formed by Houlton residents." Id. at 182.
43. See Houlton, 175 F.3d at 182. The other plaintiffs in the suit were David
Condon and two other local trash haulers, William Faulkner and Fred Spellman.
See id. Plaintiffs argued that the 1997 Ordinance violated the Commerce Clause,
the Takings Clause, and the Contract Clause, in addition to state-law claims under
the town charter. See id. In counts I, III, and IV, they alleged that the 1997 Ordi-
nance violated their civil rights. See Houlton Citizens' Coalition v. Town of Houl-
ton, 11 F. Supp.2d 105, 106 (D. Me. 1998). Plaintiffs further alleged that the Town
Charter was violated for failure to solicit bids and failure to notify the public prior
to the announcement of the 1997 Contract. See id.
44. See Houlton, 175 F.3d at 182. The district court, in granting summary
judgement, found that the plaintiffs "were unlikely to prevail on the merits." Id.
45. See id. at 183 (stating that "[tihe appellants find four fatal flaws in the
Town's waste management scheme: (1) it insults the dormant Commerce Clause;
(2) it takes property without just compensation; (3) it impermissibly burdens con-
tracts; and (4) its implementation by the Town violates the municipal charter") Id.
The appellants also alleged that the Town violated its charter by not allowing for
another round of sealed and competitive bidding when it renegotiated its contract
6
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Circuit concluded that the 1997 Ordinance did not violate the
Commerce, Takings, nor Contract Clauses and affirmed the lower
court's ruling.46
III. BACKGROUND
A. Brief History of the "Dormant" Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution states
that "the Congress shall have power ... to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
tribes."47 In the 1824 landmark case Gibbons v. Ogden,48 the United
States Supreme Court held that Congress has absolute authority to
regulate matters which affect interstate commerce. 49 However,
states may legislate in those areas which Congress does not have
authority to control under the Constitution.50 States thus therefore
may regulate intrastate commerce, but their regulatory power has
limits. The United States Supreme Court held in Gibbons that Con-
gress also has the power to regulate intrastate commerce in situa-
tions where interstate commerce is ultimately affected. 51 This
with Andino. See id. at 191. The district court held the renegotiated contract was
valid. See id. at 192. However, the court of appeals concluded that the district court
should have dismissed the supplemental law claim "without prejudice" because the
scenario was so complex that a state court should make the ruling. See id.
46. See id. at 192.
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
48. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
49. See id. at 196-97. Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though
limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, is vested in
Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its
constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are
found in the constitution of the United States.
Id.
50. See id. The Gibbons Court explained that there are areas under the Consti-
tution which Congress was not given the power to regulate, such as "[i] inspection
laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as well as laws for regulating
the internal commerce of a state, and those with respect turnpikes, roads, ferries,
etc." Id. The Court asserted that these areas were not surrendered by the states to
the federal government and that state regulation would be "most advantageously
exercised by the states themselves." Id.; see also South Carolina State Highway
Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 185 (1938) (indicating lack of federal
legislation in many areas escape attention of Congress "because of their local char-
acter and their number and diversity").
51. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I at 194-95. ChiefJustice Marshall held that
Congress does not have the power under the Constitution to regulate commerce
"completely within a particular State, which do not affect other States". Id. There-
fore, "[t]he completely internal commerce of a State, then, may be considered as
reserved for the State itself." Id.
2000] HOULTON
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power, though not explicitly stated in the Constitution, is known as
the dormant Commerce Clause.52 It assumes the nation as a whole
is one common market "in which state lines cannot be made barri-
ers to the free flow of both raw materials and finished goods in
response to the economic laws of supply and demand." 53 This
clause prevents economic isolationism between the states by barring
regulations that benefit in-state economic interests at the expense
of out-of-state competitors.54
B. Challenging An Ordinance Under the "Dormant" Commerce
Clause
When a party challenges an ordinance as a violation of the dor-
mant Commerce Clause, a court must first "determine whether...
[the challenged ordinance] 'regulates evenhandedly with only inci-
dental effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against in-
terstate commerce." 55 Discrimination occurs when an ordinance
favors in-state economic interests at the expense of out-of-state in-
terests.56 Furthermore, an "ordinance is no less discriminatory be-
cause in-state or in-town [interests] are also covered by the
prohibition." 57
An ordinance can be discriminatory on its face in either pur-
pose or effect. If the purpose of the ordinance is discriminatory on
52. See Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245, 252 (1829). The
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a state act which gave Black Bird
the right to build a damn across a creek violated the commerce clause. See id. at
251. The Court held that since Congress had not passed any act regulating small
navigable creeks, the act was not "repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in
its dormant state". Id. at 252.
53. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 803 (1976).
54. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 578
(1997) (stating that "[b]y encouraging economic isolationism, prohibitions on out-
of-state access to in-state resources serve the very evil that the dormant Commerce
Clause was designed to prevent"); New Energy Company of Indiana v. Limbach,
486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988) (stating Commerce Clause prohibits economic protec-
tionism if state discriminates against interstate commerce); see also H.P. Hood &
Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).Justice Jackson wrote "[t]his principle
that our economic unit is the Nation, which alone has the gamut of powers neces-
sary to control of the economy, including the vital power of erecting customs barri-
ers against foreign competition, has as its corollary that the states are not separable
economic units." Id. at 537-38.
55. Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep't of Environmental Quality, 511 U.S.
93, 99 (1994) (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 411 U.S. 322, 336 (1979)).
56. See id.
57. C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994); Dean
Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951). For a discussion of Dean Milk, see
infra note 67.
8
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its face, then the ordinance is per se unconstitutional. 58 If, however,
the purpose of the ordinance is neutral on its face, the ordinance
may still be unconstitutional if a court finds the ordinance discrimi-
natory in its effect.59 To overcome the discriminatory burden of
proof, a "municipality can demonstrate, under rigorous scrutiny,
that it has no other means to advance a legitimate local interest."60
In most cases, courts have been hard pressed to find a legitimate
local interest, although some have been found. 61
If a court finds the ordinance nondiscriminatory in its purpose
and effect, then the ordinance enjoys a certain presumption of con-
stitutionality. 62 But the analysis is not complete. A court will next
58. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392 (stating that "[d]iscrimination against inter-
state commerce in favor of local business or investment is per se invalid"); Fort
Gratiot Sanitary v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 359
(1992) (citing New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988)) (stat-
ing, '[a] state statute that clearly discriminates against interstate commerce is
therefore unconstitutional"); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624
(1978) (stating that "where simple economic protectionism is effected by state leg-
islation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected").
59. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333
(1977). Hunt held unconstitutional a North Carolina law preventing the labeling
of North Carolina apples. See id. The Court found that even though the law was
neutral on its face, the law's effect discriminated against Washington apple growers
in favor of local producers. See id. at 349-53. Since the State was unable to prove
legitimate local needs and the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives, the law
was invalid. See id. at 354.
60. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392; See Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 101 (quot-
ing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 411 U.S. 322, 337 (1979)) (stating, "[t]he State's burden
of justification is so heavy that 'facial discrimination by itself may be a fatal de-
fect'"); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (citing Hughes, 411 U.S. at 322)
(commenting if "a state law is shown to discriminate against interstate commerce
'either on its face or in practical effect,' the burden falls on the State to demon-
strate both that the statute 'serves a legitimate local purpose,' and that this pur-
pose could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means").
61. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986) (holding State of Maine has
legitimate interest in banning importation of baitfish due to imperfectly under-
stood environmental risks); Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 955 (1982) (stat-
ing that "there are legitimate reasons for the special treatment accorded requests
to transport ground water across state lines"); Asbell v. State of Kansas, 209 U.S.
251 (holding restriction of diseased cattle into state of Kansas was not in violation
of Commerce Clause because healthy cattle were admitted). But see Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 411 U.S. 322 (1979). In Hughes, an Oklahoma law prohibited the trans-
fer of Oklahoma minnows outside of the state was challenged. See id. at 323, n.1.
The Supreme Court held the law unconstitutional because Oklahoma failed to try
nondiscriminatory alternatives that could have achieved the same legitimate local
purpose. See id. at 337-38.Justice Brennan stated that the law "is certainly not a 'last
ditch' attempt at conservation after nondiscriminatory alternatives have proved un-
feasible. It is rather a choice of the most discriminatory means even though non-
discriminatory alternatives would seem likely to fulfill the State's purported
legitimate local purpose more effectively." Id. at 338.
62. See Maharg, Inc. v. Van Wert Solid Waste Management Dist., No.
3:99CV7245, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13182, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 6, 1999).
2000] HOULTON
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apply the balancing test set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 63 The
Pike court held that an ordinance is invalid if "the burden imposed
on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits." 64 A court must weigh the burden imposed on inter-
state commerce against any legitimate local purposes the state
advances. 65
To determine whether a state has advanced a legitimate local
purpose, the court must consider the local interest served by the
ordinance. 66 Furthermore, the court must determine whether the
state could obtain the same result through an alternative adequate
means which may have a lesser impact upon interstate commerce. 67
It is the challenging party that carries the burden of proof. As such,
if the challenging party can prove that a less detrimental adequate
mean exists, then the ordinance will not be upheld. 68
C. Judicial Interpretation of the Commerce Clause in Relation
to Flow Control Ordinances
Courts employ three methods of analysis in determining the
constitutionality of a flow control ordinance. The first method is to
use traditional dormant Commerce Clause analysis. 69 The second
method is to determine if the local government is acting as a "mar-
ket participant" or a "market regulator."70 Dormant Commerce
Clause analysis applies only if the government is acting as a market
63. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
64. Id. at 142. If the court determines that the there are legitimate local inter-
ests that cannot be served by any other means, then the court will hold the ordi-
nance constitutional. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.; Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). In Dean Milk, the
City of Madison, Wisconsin passed a regulation that made it unlawful to sell any
milk which had not been processed within 5 miles of the city. See id. at 350. Dean
Milk Co., an Illinois corporation that distributed milk in both Illinois and Wiscon-
sin, filed suit alleging that the ordinance burdened interstate commerce. See id. at
351. The city responded by arguing that the regulation was not designed to dis-
criminate against out-of-state milk producers, but rather to allow inspectors to as-
sure the quality of the milk being consumed in Madison. See id. The Supreme
Court disagreed, holding that even if the intent of the regulation was health and
safety, there were reasonable non-discriminatory alternatives available. See id. at
352-57. For example, the city could have sent its inspectors out to individual plants
to monitor milk production and passed that cost along to the importing producers
and processors. See id. at 354-55.
68. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
69. For a discussion of the traditional dormant Commerce Clause approach,
see text accompanying supra notes 55-68.
70. For a discussion of the market participation analysis, see text accompany-
ing supra notes 87-93.
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regulator.71 A market participant is exempt from dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis.72 The third method is to look to the bidding
process the local government used in choosing the waste hauler.7 3
If the court finds the bidding process to be "open and competitive,"
then there is no dormant Commerce Clause violation.74
1. Traditional "Dormant" Commerce Clause Analysis
The first method courts employ to determine the constitution-
ality of an ordinance under the dormant Commerce Clause is the
traditional method. In C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,75
the Supreme Court determined whether a local flow control ordi-
nance violated the dormant Commerce Clause. 76 In Carbone, the
Town of Clarkstown (Clarkstown) constructed a new transfer sta-
tion and hired a private contractor to manage it.7 7 In order to
amortize the cost of the facility, Clarkstown passed a flow control
ordinance which required all solid waste to be processed at its des-
ignated transfer station. 78 The ordinance therefore guaranteed
Clarkstown a minimum amount of waste that would pass through its
designated facility and ensured a steady stream of income through
"tipping fees." 79
C & A Carbone, Inc.(Carbone) brought suit in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York claiming
71. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Camden Cry. & Vicinity v.
Mayor and Council of the City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 219-21 (1984); Salem
Blue Collar Workers Assn. v. City of Salem, 832 F.Supp. 852, 858 (D. N.J. 1993).
72. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 809-10 (1976); Red
River Serv. Corp. v. City of Minot, 146 F.3d 583, 586 (1998).
73. For a discussion of an "open and competitive" analysis of dormant Com-
merce Clause issue, see infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
74. See Houlton, 175 F.3d 178, 189 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating "this open and
freely accessible bidding process ensured a level playing field for all interested
parties and provided sufficiently broad market access to quell Commerce Clause
concerns"); see also Harvey & Harvey, 68 F.3d 788, 802 (3rd Cir. 1995) (asserting
that "a local authority could choose a single provider-without impermissibly dis-
criminating against inter-state commerce-so long as the selection process was
open and competitive and offered truly equal opportunities to in- and out-of-state
businesses").
75. 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
76. See id. at 389.
77. See id. at 386. A local private contractor constructed the new transfer sta-
tion for $1.4 million dollars. See id. The contractor also agreed to operate the facil-
ity for a period of five years, upon which time Clarkstown would purchase the
facility for one dollar. See id.
78. See id. at 386.
79. See id. at 387. In the contract with the private contractor, Clarkstown guar-
anteed a minimum of 120,000 tons per year, with a tipping fee of eighty-one dol-
lars per ton. See id. If Clarkstown could not provide the minimum, then it agreed to
provide the contractor with the difference. See id.
2000]
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that the flow control ordinance violated the dormant Commerce
Clause because the ordinance forced Carbone to ship its non-re-
cyclable residue to Clarkstown's transfer station.8 0 The Supreme
Court agreed with Carbone and concluded that the ordinance dis-
criminated against interstate commerce. 8 1 It reasoned that forcing
Carbone and others to use Clarkstown's transfer station led to in-
creased costs for out-of-state interests and deprived those interests
access to a local market. 82 The Court also rejected Clarktown's ar-
gument that the ordinance advanced legitimate local interests, such
as protecting public health and the environment.8 3 The Court fo-
cused on Clarkstown's admission that it passed the ordinance to
increase financing and generate revenue. 8 4 The Court found the
ordinance discriminatory in effect because it substantially affected
the economics of interstate commerce. 85 The Court stated it ac-
cordingly could not apply the Pike test.86
2. "Market Participation" v. "Market Regulator" Analysis
The second method courts may employ to determine the con-
stitutionality of an ordinance under the dormant Commerce Clause
is the market participant doctrine. In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp.,8 7 the United States Supreme Court set forth the market par-
80. See C &A Carbone, Inc., 511 U.S. at 388. C & A Carbone, Inc. is a proces-
sor of solid waste. See id. at 387. The company has a recycling facility in Clarkstown.
See id. at 387-88. At this location the company sorts and bales the bulk solid waste
that it receives and transfers it to other facilities to be further processed. See id.
81. See id. at 394-5 Clarkstown argued that the ordinance was nondiscrimina-
tory "because it does not differentiate solid waste on the basis of its geographic
origin" and that it bans local, as well as out-of-state, operators. Id. at 390. The
Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the process of processing and disposal is
covered under the Commerce Clause in this case and that "[t]he ordinance is no
less discriminatory because in-state or in-town processors are also covered by the
prohibition." Id. at 391.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 392-93. Amicae briefs asserted that local flow control ordinances,
in the face of diminishing land fill space and rising environmental cleanup costs,
are necessary to provide safe treatment of solid waste. See id.
84. See id. at 393-94 (stating that "[b]y itself, of course, revenue generation is
not a local interest that can justify discrimination against interstate commerce.
Otherwise States could impose discriminatory taxes against solid waste originating
outside the State").
85. See C &A Carbone, Inc., 511 U.S. at 389 (requiring Carbone to send out-of-
state non-recyclable waste to Route 303 transfer station elevates price for out-of-
state interests in waste disposal).
86. See id. at 390 (stating, "[als we find that the ordinance discriminates
against interstate commerce, we need not resort to the Pike test") (emphasis in
original).
87. See 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
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ticipant test.8 8 The Supreme Court held that dormant Commerce
Clause analysis does not apply if a local government acts as a "mar-
ket participant", stating that "[n]othing in the purposes animating
the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congres-
sional action, from participating in the market and exercising the
right to favor its own citizens over others."8 9 To be considered a
"market participant," a court must decide if "a private party could
have engaged in the same actions."90 A private party, for example,
may not take any action that evokes criminal sanctions. 91 The "mar-
ket participant" doctrine also limits the governmental burden on
commerce to the particular market in which the state is participat-
ing.92 Therefore, a state-imposed condition which has a substantial
88. See id.
89. See id. at 810. A Maryland statute provided bounties to scrap processors in
order to alleviate the growing problem of abandoned automobiles. See id. at 796-
97. In order to receive the bounty, scrap processors had to submit documentation
required by the state. See id. at 798. The legislature, however, amended the law,
forcing out-of-state processors to submit more burdensome documentation. See id.
at 801. The Supreme Court held the law constitutional, stating that Maryland was
neither attempting to prohibit the flow of hulks nor trying to regulate their occur-
rence. See id. at 806; see SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 510 (noting that "[t]he Maryland
program affected the market no differently than if Maryland were a private com-
pany bidding up the price of auto hulks").
90. See SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 510 (citing Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437
(1992) (striking down Wyoming statute that required all in-state electrical utilities
to fuel power plants with Oklahoma-mined coal holding local purchasing require-
ment for private businesses invalid because private business could not have done
same)).
91. See id. (stating criminal sanctions for failure to follow flow control ordi-
nances qualifies town as market regulator and not market participant); Washing-
ton State Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 631 (9th Cir.
1982) (noting that market participation exception did not apply to program that
.establishes civil and criminal penalties which only a state and not a mere proprie-
tor [could] enforce").
92. See South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 98
(1984). The State of Alaska proposed to sell state owned timber. See id. at 84. A
potential buyer however, was required to partially process the state owned timber
prior to its exportation. See id. South Central Timber, an Alaska corporation which
had no processing facilities in Alaska, brought suit for an injunction, claiming the
in-state processing requirement violated the Commerce Clause. See id. at 85-6. The
State of Alaska responded that the requirement was within the "market partici-
pant" exception "arguing that 'Alaska's entry into the market may be viewed as
precisely the same type of subsidy to local interests that the Court found unobjec-
tionable in Alexandria Scrap.'" Id. at 95 (citing Brief for Respondents at 24). The
Supreme Court, however, distinguished Alexandria Scrap. See id. The Court held
that in Alexandria Scrap, the State of Maryland was merely subsidizing the market
for the removal of hulks and therefore a dealer was free to process the hulk wher-
ever it saw fit, possibly out-of-state and bypassing the advantages of the subsidy. See
id. Whereas, "[u]nder the Alaska requirement ... the choice is made for him: if he
buys timber from the State he is not free to take the timber out of state prior to
processing." Id. The Court wrote that the "market participant" doctrine "is not
carte blanche to impose any conditions that the State has the economic power to
2000]
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regulatory effect upon a broader market will not qualify under the
"market participant" exception. 93
In SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown,94 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals determined whether Smithtown acted as a "market partici-
pant" or a "market regulator."95 In Smithtown, Smithtown had en-
tered into an agreement with the neighboring town of Huntington,
whereby Smithtown would share its landfill in exchange for use of
Huntington's proposed incinerator (hereafter known as the Hunt-
ington incinerator).96 To guarantee the "tipping fees" necessary to
finance the Huntington incinerator, Smithtown enacted a flow con-
trol ordinance that restricted disposal of all acceptable waste to the
Huntington incinerator. 97 Smithtown also entered into a waste col-
lection contract with SSC Corp. designating the Huntington incin-
erator as the only facility for the disposal of residential and
commercial garbage. 98
dictate, and does not validate any requirement merely because the State imposes it
upon someone with whom it is in contractual privity." Id. at 97. Therefore, the
Court concluded that the "market participant" doctrine is limited only to a narrow
market in which the state participates and goes no further. See id. at 97-8.
93. See id. at 99. The Supreme Court of the United States noted that broader
market (i.e. downstream) regulations have a greater regulatory effect than limita-
tions imposed on an immediate transaction. See id. The Court was concerned for
two reasons. First, downstream regulation would allow for states to regulate the
economic relationships between trading partners instead of the purchasing activity
itself. See id. Second, the restriction occurs after the parties have performed their
contractual duties "rather than during the course of an ongoing commercial rela-
tionship". Id. However, Justice White wrote in a footnote:
This is not to say that the State could evade the reasoning of this opinion
by merely including a provision in its contract that title does not pass
until the processing is complete. It is the substance of the transaction,
rather than the label attached to it, that governs Commerce Clause
analysis.
Id. at n.7.
94. 66 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 1995).
95. See id. at 506.
96. See id. at 506. Ogden Martin Systems was to build the incinerator and the
New York State Environmental Facilities Corporation was to finance it through the
issuance of tax-free bonds. See id. at 506.
97. See id. at 507. Smithtown would rely upon ad valorem property taxes and
tipping fees at the incinerator to secure payment on the tax-free bonds. See id.
Consequently, Smithtown enacted the flow control ordinance to ensure that a cer-
tain amount of waste would be processed each year, thereby generating a guaran-
teed amount of tipping fees. See id.
98. See id. at 507. Smithtown divided itself into ten "improvement" districts
and solicited open bids from waste service contractors. See id. Smithtown also made
prospective bidders alert to the fact that they would have to sign an "Improvement
Contract" if they were chosen. See id. The contract stated that each company would
be required to dispose of their residential garbage at the incinerator. See id. There-
fore, each company had to figure into their proposals the sixty-five dollars a ton
tipping fee that would be charged at the incinerator, as well as the amount of
14
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SSC Corp. brought suit against Smithtown in federal court,
claiming that the contract and the ordinance violated the dormant
Commerce Clause. 99 SSC Corp. argued that the dormant Com-
merce Clause should apply because Smithtown acted as a market
regulator because it exercised its powers of civil and criminal en-
forcement.100 Smithtown responded that the dormant Commerce
Clause did not apply because it was a "market participant."10 1
Smithtown claimed "market participant" status because it "placed
substantial public funds at risk by assuming extensive financial obli-
gations" and it merely "protect[ed] the town's financial investment
in the incinerator."10 2 The Second Circuit disagreed, holding that
Smithtown was not a "market participant" because the town
threatened noncompliance with criminal fines and jail terms. 103
expected garbage from each district. See id. SSC won seven of the ten residential
contracts. See id.
99. See SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 508. SSC charged Smithtown $218 per household.
See id. This number was derived from the sixty-five dollar per ton "tipping fee"
charged at the incinerator added to the estimated $126 dollar per house charge
for collection services. See id. The $218 dollars was then assessed to each resident's
property tax bill. See id. Two years later, Smithtown accused SSC of disposing
Smithtown residential waste at other facilities which charged less than the sixty-five
dollar "tipping fee" at Smithtown's incinerator. See id. In doing so, Smithtown al-
leged that SSC was pocketing the difference. See id. Therefore, Smithtown decided
to withhold more that $750,000 in payments. See id. It is at this point that SSC
brought its suit against Smithtown in federal court. See id.
100. See id. at 512.
101. See id.
102. Id. Smithtown argued that the language in South-Central Timber Devel-
opment, Inc. v. Wunnicke, supra note 92, suggested "that Alaska's local processing
requirements would have been exempt from Commerce Clause scrutiny if the state
had somehow participated in the processing market - for example, by owning a
few timbermills." Id. at 512. However, the court pointed out that this premise was
explicitly refuted in Wyoming v. Oklahoma. See id. (citing Wyoming v. Oklahoma,
502 U.S. 473 (1992)). There, the United States Supreme Court held that although
Wyoming was allowed to act as a "market participant" in the purchasing of local
coal, it did not mean that all Wyoming's actions constituted "market participa-
tion". Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 454-59. Only those actions which a private party could
have engaged in are considered "market participation." See id. Smithtown also
argued from Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245 (3rd
Cir. 1989). The Court of Appeals in Swin held that a local government could oper-
ate a landfill and be considered a "market participant." See id. at 250. Smithtown
argued that an incinerator, like a landfill, is essentially a "municipal facility" and
therefore Smithtown deserved "market participant" status. See SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at
513. The Second Circuit disagreed with Smithtown by distinguishing Swin from the
present case. See id. In Smithtown, unlike Swin, there were criminal penalties for
failure to comply with the flow control ordinance. See id. Since this forced business
transactions, the court concluded that Smithtown was a "market regulator." See id.
103. See SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 512. The penalty for violating the Smithtown
"flow control ordinance is an unclassified misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of up
to $5,000 and up to 60 days' imprisonment." See id. at 507. For a discussion of the
market participant doctrine, see supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
20001
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Having concluded that Smithtown was not a "market participant,"
the court accordingly applied Carbone's dormant Commerce Clause
analysis to strike down the flow control ordinance as
unconstitutional.10 4
The Second Circuit, however, found constitutional the con-
tract that designated the Huntington incinerator as the sole waste
disposal facility. 10 5 The court found Smithtown to be a "market par-
ticipant" in waste collection and disposal. 10 6 The court relied on the
fact that Smithtown spent its own tax dollars to "contract out" a
service that it could have performed on its own. 10 7 The court found
that because Smithtown was a buyer and a consumer of collection
and disposal services, it could mandate a location in SSC Corp.'s
contract where SSC must dispose its waste.' 08 Because it found
104. See id. at 513-14. Under Carbone, the Second Circuit found unconstitu-
tional Smithtown's flow control ordinance because it facially discriminated against
interstate commerce by channeling all Smithtown's garbage to the single incinera-
tor. See id. at 514. As a result, both in-state and out-of-state waste disposal compa-
nies were excluded from participating in Smithtown's market for waste services. See
id. This discriminatory result meant that Smithtown would have to prove a legiti-
mate local interest that could not be achieved in any other way other than through
the flow control ordinance. See id. The Second Circuit concluded that Smithtown
failed in this regard, citing less discriminatory alternatives that were available in
Carbone. See id. For example, if Smithtown's interest was in health and safety, it
could have enacted uniform health and safety regulations. See id. Alternatively, if
Smithtown's interest was in ensuring the financing that was necessary to build and
maintain the incinerator, it could have issued municipal bonds or added a general
tax to each household. See id. Because these options were available to Smithtown,
the Second Circuit struck down the flow control ordinance under the dormant
Commerce Clause. See id.
105. See id. at 506.
106. See id. at 515.
107. See id. at 515 (finding Smithtown market participant in waste collection
and disposal because it chose not to use town employees and town equipment).
The court based this part of its decision on White v. Massachusetts Council of
Construction Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983). There, the Supreme Court held that
an executive order issued by the Mayor of Boston requiring all publicly funded
construction projects to be performed by a work force of at least fifty percent Bos-
ton residents was constitutional under the Commerce Clause. See id. at 205-06. The
Supreme Court stated that "[i]nsofar as the city expended only its own funds in
entering into [waste disposal] contracts for public projects, it [is] a market partici-
pant ...." Id. at 214-15. In light of this holding, the Second Circuit in SSC Corp.
concluded that if Smithtown could force SSC to hire fifty percent of its workforce
from Smithtown, then there would be no reason why Smithtown could not also
require SSC to use the town's incinerator. See SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 515. The court
stated "[b]ecause the waste disposal services are 'substantially if informally' being
provided to Smithtown, the town can decide with whom it will deal." Id.
108. SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 517. The Second Circuit reinforced this holding by
pointing to the potential liability Smithtown would face under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). See id. at
516. If Smithtown was unable to mandate a location for its waste disposal as a
"market participant," it would be unable to prevent CERCLA liability. See id. This
result would be inconsistent with the aims of Congress because CERCLA was in-
16
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Smithtown to be a "market participant", the Second Circuit held
that the contract was "free from the strictures of the Commerce
Clause."109
3. "Open and Competitive" Bidding Process Analysis
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals took a different approach
to flow control ordinances in Harvey & Harvey v. County of Chester.I1 0
In Harvey, the Third Circuit analyzed the Pennsylvania Municipal
Waste Act("Act").' 1 ' The Act required each county to submit a
plan for the long-term processing and disposal of its waste. 11 2
tended to "encourage 'arrangers' of waste disposal to select environmentally se-
cure disposal sites .... " Id. Accordingly, Congress intended to allow towns to have
a voice in the selection of waste disposal sites. See id. For a further discussion of
CERCLA liability, see infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
109. Id. at 506.
110. 68 F.3d 788 (3d Cir. 1995).
111. See id. at 793. The goal of the Pennsylvania Municipal Waste Act (the
"Waste Act") is to "protect the public health, safety, and welfare from the short-
and long-term dangers of the transportation, processing, treatment, storage and
disposal of municipal waste." Id. (citing Waste Act, 53 P.S. § 4000.102(b) (3)). The
Waste Act authorizes each county to establish a flow control ordinance. See id. The
policy goal of these flow control ordinances is stated in § 102(a) (10) of the Waste
Act. See id. It states:
Authoring counties to control the flow of municipal waste is neces-
sary, among other reasons, to guarantee the long-term economic viability
of resource recovery facilities and municipal waste landfills, to ensure that
such facilities and landfills can be financed, to moderate the cost of such
facilities and landfills over the long term, to protect existing capacity and
to assist in the development of markets for recyclable materials by guaran-
teeing a steady flow of such materials.
53 P.S. § 4000.102(a) (10). Provisions of the Waste Act state that each flow control
ordinance may designate a certain waste facility for a period of ten years. See Har-
vey, 68 F.3d at 793. (citing Waste Act, 53 P.S. § 4000.303(e)). There is no require-
ment that the facility be within each county. See id. However, a local facility is
required to be given first choice as to the disposal and processing of locally gener-
ated waste. See id. (citing Waste Act, 53 P.S. § 4000.106(6)). Furthermore, alterna-
tive programs and facilities must be considered and any selection must be made
through an open and competitive process. See id. (citing Waste Act, 53 P.S.
§ 4000.502(f) (2)). Alternatively, if a town decides to enter the waste market, either
through direct ownership or operation, then it must set forth an explanation for
its decision, "giving consideration to the comprehensive costs and benefits of pri-
vate ownership and operation of such facilities." Id. (citing Waste Act, 53 P.S.
§ 4000.502(m)).
112. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 793. Each waste management plan is to be reviewed
during its preparation by a county advisory committee, which consists of represent-
atives of industry, civic groups, and the county's municipalities. See id. The purpose
of the county advisory committee is make proposals as to changes to the plan it
deems appropriate. See id. (citing Waste Act, 53 P.S. § 4000.503(a)). The proposed
plan must also be submitted to a county advisory committee at least thirty days
before it is submitted to the DER. See id. (citing Waste Act, 53 P.S. § 4000.503(d)).
A county must also make the proposed plan available to the public for review and
comment for a period of ninety days and hold at least one public hearing on it. See
id. (citing Waste Act, 53 P.S. § 4000.503(c)). Once adopted by the county, the plan
2000] 409
17
Barocas: Houlton Citizens' Coalition v. Town of Houlton: Is an Open and Co
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000
410 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XI: p. 393
Chester County submitted its proposal but the Department of Envi-
ronmental Resources(DER) informed the county that it must con-
trol its flow of waste before DER would approve the proposal. 113
Accordingly, Chester County enacted a flow control ordinance that
divided the county into two service areas and required the waste
generated by each service area to be disposed of at a county-desig-
nated facility. 114 The ordinance allowed other sites, including out-
of-state facilities, to apply to become a designated facility.115 How-
ever, an agreement between Chester County and the Chester
County Solid Waste Authority ("Authority") provided that "the
County will oppose the construction, acquisition, operation or des-
ignation of any facility that might divert revenue from
Lanchester."16
Plaintiff, Harvey & Harvey, a Delaware corporation operating
as an interstate collector, hauler, and processor of municipal solid
waste, sought a preliminary injunction in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging that the
Chester County ordinance violated the Commerce Clause of the
must be ratified by "fifty percent of the municipalities in the county, representing
at least fifty percent of the population." Id. (citing Waste Act, 53 P.S.
§ 4000.503(d); 504(c)). Once done, the plan is then given to the DER for ap-
proval. See id. Persons who object are given the right to appeal the decision to the
Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board. See id. The plan, upon final approval,
may be revised at any time "but must be revised at least three years prior to the
time that the remaining capacity for a county is exhausted." Id. (citing 25 Pa. Code
§ 272.251 (b); 25 Pa. Code § 272.251 (a)(1)). Furthermore, if a county uses an ordi-
nance as opposed to a contract to mandate where waste will be disposed of or
processed, then the county must explain its rationale for doing so and attach a
copy of the proposed ordinance. See id. (citing Waste Act, 53 P.S. § 4000.502(1)).
113. See id. at 794. Chester County's proposed plan was a revision of a waste
management plan that was passed in 1990. See id. That plan "designat[ed] the
Southeastern Chester County Refuse Authority Sanitary Landfill (the "SECCRA
Landfill") and the Chester County Solid Waste Authority Lanchester Sanitary
Landfill (the "Lanchester Landfill") as the primary disposal sites for the County."
Id. Chester County chose to revise the plan due to concerns over possible adverse
affects on the "northern tier" of Chester County due to the exclusive designation
of the SECCRA and Lanchester landfills. See id. Chester's county advisory commit-
tee recommended that a private Montgomery County landfill(the "Pottstown
Landfill") be included as a disposal option. See id.
114. See id. at 794-5. Even though DER refused to approve the plan until a
flow control ordinance was enacted, nothing in Chester's original waste manage-
ment plan mandated the adoption of flow control. Here, however, Chester chose
to abide by DER's recommendation and allocated the SECCRA Landfill and the
Lanchester Landfill as the two service areas. See id. However, the Pottstown Landfill
was allowed to receive a certain portion of Chester County's waste. See id. at 795.
115. See id.
116. Id.
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United States Constitution. 1 7 Harvey & Harvey argued that the or-
dinance discriminated against the interstate solid waste market by
prohibiting both the export of the county's solid waste to alterna-
tive sites and states and the import of out-of-state waste processing
and disposal services. 118 The Third Circuit disagreed with Harvey &
Harvey. 119 The court asserted that simply because the county's site
happened to be in-state, that alone did not establish that Chester
County's regulation discriminated against interstate commerce. 20
The court then departed from Carbone's discriminatory effect
analysis and focused on the selection process for waste service prov-
iders. 121 The court distinguished the ordinance in Carbone by stat-
ing that there was no provision allowing the addition of other sites,
nor was there a time limit for the designated facilities. 22
The Third Circuit then set forth the following factors a court
should consider when determining if out-of-state bidders were de-
prived access to the local market: "(1) the designation process; (2)
the duration of the designation; and (3) the likelihood of an
amendment to add alternative sites." 123 Therefore, a local govern-
ment may rebut a discrimination claim and avoid Commerce
Clause scrutiny by making a clear showing that the "designation
process was open, fair, and competitive" and that it was "deter-
mined by objective criteria which do not have the effect of favoring
in-state interests." 124 However, the Third Circuit added that even if
117. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 794-95. Harvey wanted the preliminary injunction
to enjoin the relevant regulations of the ordinance from being enforced. See id. at
795. The district court denied the preliminary injunction, citing that Harvey had
not made a sufficient showing of immediate and irreparable harm. See id. The
district court consequently set a trial date for September 12, 1994. See id.
118. See id. at 795.
119. Id. at 801.
120. See id. The court then set forth three factors which need to be examined
in determining whether a flow control ordinance discriminates against interstate
commerce. See id. For a list of these factors, see text accompanying infra notes 123.
121. See id. at 802 (stating that "a flow control ordinance requires all waste to
be processed or deposited in state for some period of time, therefore, does not
necessarily violate the dormant Commerce Clause unless out-of-state businesses
did not compete on an even playing field for the designation").
122. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 800 (stating that "the town's likely ownership of the
transfer station after five years seems to render the station's monopoly perma-
nent"); Maryellen Suhrhoff, Comment: Solid Waste Flow Control and the Commerce
Clause: Circumventing Carbone, 7 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 186, 195 (1996) (comment-
ing that Harvey court noted the facility in Carbone had a long-term monopoly).
123. Harvey, 68 F.3d at 801.
124. Id. at 803. The Third Circuit noted that evidence of an open and com-
petitive bidding process might include the following:
bid solicitation, selection criteria, evaluation of bidders, et alia,but such
evidence alone may be insufficient to prove the flow control scheme's
neutrality. The government defendants in these cases might also present
20001
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a local municipality demonstrates that it has an open and fair bid-
ding process, the party challenging the ordinance may still use the
Pike balancing test to prove that "the burden imposed on such com-
merce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits."1 25
The Third Circuit ultimately concluded that Chester County's
designation process appeared to be biased in favor of local interests
and against interstate commerce. 126 However, since the lower court
was unable to utilize the Third Circuit's clarifications on this issue,
the case was remanded back to the district court.1 27
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
The question before the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Houl-
ton was whether the 1997 Ordinance was discriminatory in its effect
on interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause. 128 The First Circuit reviewed the U.S. Supreme Court's
analysis in Carbone, the Second Circuit's holding in Smithtown, and
the Third Circuit's decision in Harvey and drew applicable law from
each. 129 The Court then addressed the District Court holding.' 30
The District Court had rejected Houlton Citizens' Coalition's
(HCC)'s argument that the 1997 Ordinance and contract with
Andino were discriminatory against out-of-state businesses and
therefore were unconstitutional. 131 Instead, the District Court ac-
cepted the Town's argument that it acted as a "market participant"
additional evidence, such as statistical evidence or expert testimony, dem-
onstrating that different aspects of the designation process are as neutral
to out-of-state interests in practice as they appear on their face.
Id.
125. Id. (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
126. See id. at 807. The Third Circuit believed that the Lanschester, SECCRA
and Pottstown facilities were favored over other sites. See id.
127. See id.
128. See Houlton Citizens Coalition v. Town of Houlton, 175 F.3d 178, 187
(1st Cir. 1999). For an overview of the 1997 Ordinance, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 36-41.
129. See id. at 184-87. For a discussion of the facts and holding of Carbone, see
supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the facts and holding
of Smithtown, see supra notes 94-109 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
facts and holding of Harvey, see supra notes 110-127 and accompanying text.
130. See id. at 187.
131. See id. HCC argued that the 1997 Ordinance and contract was similar to
the Clarkstown's ordinance in Carbone since they both forced waste to be passed
through a single contractor thereby denying "out-of-state businesses of access to a
local market." Id. quoting Clarkstown, 511 U.S. at 389.
20
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and that Commerce Clause scrutiny did not apply.' 32 The First Cir-
cuit, however, rejected the Town's argument and found that the
Town was not a "market participant."133
The First Circuit stated that it was reluctant to rely on the Sec-
ond Circuit's "market participant" dormant Commerce Clause anal-
ysis in Smithtown for two reasons. 34 First, the court asserted that
Smithtown was a novel decision whose ratio decidendi had yet to be
adopted by the Supreme Court.135 Second, the Court distinguished
Smithtown on the fact that the Town's 1997 ordinance created
forced business transactions that Smithtown's ordinance did not.136
The 1997 Ordinance required self haulers to use the designated
transfer station, and it required those who chose not to self-haul to
contract individually with Andino to remove their waste. 137
Instead of relying on the lower court's reasoning, the First Cir-
cuit affirmed the decision on other grounds. The Court addressed
the principles behind the dormant Commerce Clause and stated
that the prevention of economic balkanization is at the core of the
doctrine.1 38 Therefore "if local legislation leaves all comers with
equal access to the local market, it does not offend the dormant
132. See id. The Town argued that the 1997 Ordinance allowed them to be-
come the sole buyer of local garbage and, like Smithtown, was acting as a market
participant when it contracted with Andino. See id. The district court judge ac-
cepted the Town's argument and after applying the Pike balancing test declared
the 1997 Ordinance constitutional. See id. The court also addressed The Town's
contract with Andino and concluded that "Houlton is acting as a 'buyer' in the
garbage collection, disposal, and processing markets, and enters those markets
'with the same freedoms and subject to the same restrictions as a private party'"
and is therefore not subject to the Commerce Clause. Id. ; Houlton Citizens' Coali-
tion v. Town of Houlton, 982 F.Supp. 40, 44 (D. Me. 1997).
133. See Houlton, 175 F.3d at 187-88.
134. See id. at 187-88.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 188. In Smithtown, forced business transactions were avoided by
the appropriation of public tax dollars to pay for waste disposal. See id. The First
Circuit noted that this distinction could not be disregarded, stating that the Sec-
ond Circuit relied upon this information in its market participation analysis. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id. (noting that "[t]he core purpose of the dormant Commerce
Clause is to prevent states and their political subdivisions from promulgating pro-
tectionist policies"); see also Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (noting that
state operating in private market "may not evade the constitutional policy against
economic Balkanization"); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 411 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979) (not-
ing that avoiding economic balkanization was central concern of Framers of Con-
stitution when they drafted Commerce Clause); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249,
276 (1946) (stating Commerce Clause "preclude[s] [a State] from taking any ac-
tion which may fairly be deemed to have the effect of impeding the free flow of
trade between States"); Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935) (asserting that
"what is ultimate is the principle that one state in its dealing with another may not
place itself in a position of economic isolation").
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Commerce Clause.' 3 9 The court reasoned that no Commerce
Clause violation occurs if both in-state and out-of-state interests are
allowed unrestricted access to a municipality's bidding process and
the municipality awards its contract to the lowest bidder. 140 This,
the court said, is because in-state interests are not given preferential
treatment and out-of-state interests are not subject to
discrimination.14 1
The First Circuit applied these principles to the 1997 Ordi-
nance and found no violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. 142
The Town had argued that it had a bidding process that was open
to all prospective bidders, both in-state and out-of-state.' 43 The re-
cord indicated no signs that the Town's decision was slanted in any
way to favor in-state iriterests even though Andino, a local firm and
low bidder, was awarded the contract. 144 Because the court found
an even playing field, it held that the Town's garbage disposal ordi-
nance did not per se violate the dormant Commerce Clause. 145
The First Circuit completed its analysis by applying the balanc-
ing test set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.146 The court concluded
that the 1997 Ordinance placed virtually no burden on interstate
commerce, and it found a "strong local interest in efficient and ef-
fective waste management."1 4 7 After comparing the two interests,
139. Houlton, 175 F.3d at 188.
140. See id. at 188-89.(stating, "to the extent that in-state and out-of-state bid-
ders are allowed to compete freely on a level playing field, there is no cause for
constitutional concern").
141. See id. at 188.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 189. The Town held an open meeting where any prospective
bidders were allowed to comment and ask questions about the project. See id. The
Town then issued a request for proposals(RFP) which the court found placed no
additional restrictions or burdens on non-local interests. See id. The 1997 Ordi-
nance did not require the bidder to haul waste to a site chosen by the Town, but
instead the bidder was allowed to choose any site they wanted. See id.
144. See Houlton, 175 F.3d at 189. Andino's contract with the Town was for a
term of seven years. See id. The First Circuit was not alarmed by this lengthy
amount of time, stating that the duration effected both in-state and out-of-state
interests the same and it did not "seem excessive considering the relatively substan-
tial commitment of equipment and other resources required on the successful bid-
der's part." Id.
145. See id. at 189 (stating that "garbage disposal scheme [did] not constitute
a per se violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, but instead regulates com-
merce evenhandedly, with no more than incidental effects on interstate trade").
146. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). For a discussion of the balancing test set forth in
Pike, see supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
147. Houlton, 175 F.3d at 189.
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the court concluded that "Houlton pass [ed] [the] test with flying
colors.",1
48
V. CRITICAL ANALySIS
The First Circuit's holding in Houlton is subject to scrutiny for
two reasons. First, the court's reliance on the Third Circuit's open-
and-competitive bidding test in Harvey may be misplaced.1 49 Sec-
ond, the court ignored the problems self-haulers face because of
the 1997 Ordinance.150
A. A Shift Away From Carbone And Toward Harvey
In reaching its holding, the First Circuit shifted away from the
traditional dormant Commerce Clause analysis set forth in Car-
bone.151 Carbone held that "a flow control ordinance coupled with a
designation discriminated in its effect" by allowing the chosen waste
company to be the sole provider of waste services within the
town.152 As such, out-of-state waste service providers were denied
access to the initial processing step.153 In Houlton, the 1997 Ordi-
nance accomplishes the same effect. Andino is the only waste com-
pany who is allowed to haul Houlton's waste. Therefore, without
competition for waste hauling services, residents and businesses will
be unable to take advantage of possibly cheaper hauling services. As
Justice Kennedy wrote in Carbone "[t]hese economic effects are
more than enough to bring the Clarkstown ordinance within the
purview of the Commerce Clause." 154
The only distinguishing factor the Houlton court could have
looked to was that both in-state and out-of-state processors had no
access to Houlton's waste market.1 55 The court's possible considera-
tion of this factor would be misplaced, however, because this effect
148. Id.
149. For a discussion of the facts and holding in Harvey, see supra notes 110-
127 and accompanying text.
150. For a discussion of self-haulers under the 1997 Ordinance, see infra
notes 177-90 and accompanying text.
151. For a discussion of the traditional analysis set forth in Carbone, see supra
text accompanying notes 55-68.
152. Harvey & Harvey, 68 F.3d 811, 810 (3d Cir. 1995) (Nygaard, J., dissent-
ing); see also C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994) (stating,
"the flow control ordinance discriminates, for it allows only the favored operator to
process waste within the limits of the town").
153. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 389.
154. Id.
155. See Houlton, 175 F.3d at 188-89. The First Circuit commented that an
"open and competitive" bidding process left everyone on level ground and there-
fore no one party was impacted greater than another. See id. The court specifically
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is not considered in a "dormant" Commerce Clause analysis.1 56 The
Supreme Court, in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dept.
of Natural Resources,157 held that a state may not protect its own in-
terests and avoid Commerce Clause analysis merely by asserting that
in-state interests are equally effected.1 58 Therefore, it is hard to un-
derstand why the First Circuit would abandon Supreme Court pre-
cedent in Carbone and resort to an adoption of the Harvey
analysis. 15 9
Judge Nygaard's dissent sheds some light on what the Houlton
court should have done. 160 Instead of focusing upon the selection
process, he concentrated on the fact that the ordinance designated
a particular facility as the sole waste facility for the town. 161 The
effect of the ordinance, according to Judge Nygaard, was to prevent
out-of-state waste service providers from accepting waste or selling
services because the ordinance mandated that a local facility be
used.162 Judge Nygaard concluded that this facet of the ordinance
was discriminatory in its effect and therefore deserved heightened
scrutiny, stating that "[t]he outcome of the selection process, how-
ever open that process may be, can be discriminatory in its practical
effect."' 163 Since heightened scrutiny should have applied here, Car-
bone's holding mandated a showing that no other means existed to
stated that "[i]n such circumstances, unrestricted access to the bidding process
constitutes unrestricted access to the relevant market." Id. at 189.
156. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994); see Dean
Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1950). The Supreme Court struck down the
City of Madison's regulation that milk be pasteurized within five miles of the city if
it was to be sold there. Dean Milk, 340 U.S. at 350. The Court noted that "[ i t is
immaterial that Wisconsin milk from outside the Madison area is subjected to the
same proscription as that moving in interstate commerce." Id. at 354, n.4.
157. 504 U.S. 353 (1992).
158. See id. at 361 (stating that "[o]ur prior cases teach that a State (or one of
its political subdivisions) may not avoid the strictures of the Commerce Clause by
curtailing the movement of articles of commerce through subdivisions of the State,
rather than through the State itself").
159. For a discussion of Carbone, see supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of Harvey, see supra notes 89-103 and accompanying text.
160. Harvey & Harvey v. County of Chester, 68 F.3d 788, 809-11 (3rd Cir.
1995).
161. See id. at 802. The majority opinion stated, "in interpreting Carbone, this
Court has focused on the process of selecting waste service providers rather than
on the effect of the regulation once a provider or providers have been chosen." Id.
Judge Nygaard stated that courts must apply heightened scrutiny to these types of
ordinances "because, regardless of the process employed in selecting waste service
providers, the effect discriminates against interstate commerce." Id. at 810.
162. See id. at 810.
163. Id. Judge Nygaard asserted that the effect of the flow control ordinance
alone is what should trigger heightened scrutiny. See id.
24
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advance a legitimate local interest. 164 Applying this to Harvey, Judge
Nygaard asserted that Chester County's ordinance would most
likely fail if remanded because there were plausible alternatives to
reaching its goals of effective waste removal. 165
Judge Nygaard's dissent sets forth a credible argument against
the wisdom of the court's sole reliance on the selection process. 166
In most dormant Commerce Clause cases dealing with flow control
ordinances, a municipality simply designates a site and forbids an
open and competitive selection processes. 167 A municipality
designates a site in an ordinance because the municipality either
owns or has invested in it.168 Courts have had little difficulty finding
such ordinances per se unconstitutional. 169
In cases where the municipality does not designate a site,
courts struggle to articulate a coherent approach for dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis.' 70 The First Circuit in Houlton considers only
164. See id. at 810-11 (stating that "heightened scrutiny analysis dictates that
'[d]iscrimination against interstate commerce in favor of local business or invest-
ment is per se invalid, save in a narrow class of cases in which the municipality can
demonstrate, under rigorous scrutiny, that it has no other means to advance a
legitimate local interest'") (quoting C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511
U.S. 383, 392 (1994) (citing Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986))).
165. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 810-11. Judge Nygaard wrote that because the flow
control ordinance was discriminatory in its effect, heightened scrutiny must be
applied. See id. He then went on to reject any claims of necessity, writing that there
were alternative methods of achieving the town's goals. See id. Judge Nygard wrote:
Although assurance of ten years of disposal capacity for county waste and
of the proper disposal of waste generated in a county are laudable goals,
the designation of the facilities under a flow control scheme may not be
essential to achieving those goals. For example, the county might seek
assurances of ten years of capacity from a few disposal facilities without
then requiring all county generated waste actually to be disposed of at
those same specific facilities.
Id. at 811.
166. For a discussion of Judge Nygaard's dissent in Harvey, see supra notes
160-65 and accompanying text.
167. See John Turner, Article: The Flow Control of Solid Waste and the Commerce
Clause: Carbone and Its Progeny, 7 ViLL. ENVTL. L.J. 203, 231 (1996) (stating that most
post-Carbone decisions involve flow control ordinances which prohibit waste from
being transported to any facility other than one designated by government instead
of process used to select facility, since facility was assigned and not open to bids).
168. See Maryellen Suhrhoff, Comment: Solid Waste Flow Control and the Commerce
Clause: Circumventing Carbone, 7 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 186, 196 (1997) (noting that
"the Harvey argument is limited to situations where the government does not own,
contract for or directly finance a facility"). For a discussion of Harvey, see supra
notes 89-103 and accompanying text.
169. See Turner, supra note 158, at 231 (noting that post-Carbone cases strike
down most ordinances because they act as export embargo and do not utilize com-
petitive selection process).
170. See id. Courts, such as the Third Circuit in Harvey, have come to recog-
nize that "the existence of a competitive bidding process, which often entails the
selection of one or more private facilities or a mix of public and private sites,
2000]
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whether the town's self-proclaimed "open and competitive" bidding
process discriminated in favor of local business.' 7' If it finds the
process discriminatory, then it holds that the ordinance violates the
dormant Commerce Clause.172 Judge Nygaard, however, indicated
in his Harvey dissent, an approach that focuses solely on the bidding
process ignores discriminatory effects that may result after the selec-
tion process. 73
In Houlton, the practical effect of the Town's flow control ordi-
nance and contract with Andino is to discriminate against both in-
state and out-of-state waste companies.174 The 1997 Ordinance cur-
rently denies both interests access to Houlton's waste disposal mar-
ket by banning town residents under the penalty of criminal
sanctions from using anyone other than Andino for their waste dis-
posal needs.175 It is this sort of protectionism which the dormant
Commerce Clause was meant to prohibit. 76
B. First Circuit Overlooks Self-Haulers?
The Houlton court virtually ignored the self-hauler segment of
Houlton's population when it concluded that the 1997 Ordinance
was not in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.' 77 The 1997
Ordinance requires all self-haulers to transport their trash to a site
designated by the Town Council.178 Houlton residents who choose
to defy the ordinance and dump elsewhere are subject to fines and
presents issues that do not exist when the local government simply compels waste
haulers to utilize a public facility." Id. at 233 (citing Harvey & Harvey, 68 F.3d 788,
802 (3d Cir. 1995)).
171. For the facts of Houlton, see supra notes 31-46 and accompanying text.
For a narrative analysis of Houlton, see supra notes 128-48 and accompanying text.
172. See Harvey & Harvey v. County of Chester, 68 F.3d 788, 806-07 (3d Cir.
1995). The Third Circuit asserted that Chester County's designation process was
not as open and competitive as Chester County said it was. See id. The court re-
manded the case back to the district court to apply the open and competitive
guidelines which it had developed. See id. at 807. For a discussion of these guide-
lines, see supra text accompanying notes 123-25.
173. See Turner, supra note 141, at 232 (stating that "it is the designation of a
single, in-state landfill, rather than the process by which it was designated, that has
resulted in the discrimination against interstate commerce"). For a discussion of
Judge Nygaard's dissent in Harvey, see supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
174. For a discussion of the 1997 Ordinance, see supra notes 36-41 and ac-
companying text.
175. For a discussion of the 1997 Ordinance, see supra notes 36-41 and ac-
companying text.
176. See Houlton, 175 F.3d at 188. For a list of cases which emphasize this
point, see supra note 138.
177. See id. at 189.
178. See id. at 181.
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penalties. 179 A possible explanation for the court's overlooking of
self-haulers is the likelihood that this segment of the waste disposal
market is so minute as to not warrant consideration. However, in
New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach,18 0 the Supreme Court held that
the size and numbers of effected parties should not be considered
where the discrimination is patent. 181 The Court reasoned that con-
sidering the size of those effected would lead to more uncertainty
in what was already a complex field of law.1 82
By denying self-haulers the right to choose waste disposal sites,
Houlton is effecting interstate and intrastate commerce by prevent-
ing out-of-state and in-state interests access to this section of Houl-
ton's economy. Self-haulers are not allowed to dispose of their
waste at alternate sites because the 1997 Ordinance forces them to
do business exclusively with Andino.1 83 Again, an argument that lo-
cal interests were also excluded would have been immaterial to the
First Circuit because of the Supreme Court's holding in Dean Milk,
holding unconstitutional ordinances that discriminate equally
against in-state and out-of-state interests.1 84 The result of this ordi-
nance on self-haulers therefore is to deny them the opportunity to
contract out with another waste disposal firm. Consequently, both
the interstate and intrastate market for waste disposal is impeded.
179. See id.
180. 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
181. See id. Appellant, New Energy Company of Indiana, filed suit to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of an Ohio revenue provision that "awards a tax credit
against the Ohio motor vehicle fuel sales tax for each gallon of ethanol sold (as a
component of gasohol) by fuel dealers, but only if the ethanol is produced in Ohio
or in a State that grants similar tax advantages to ethanol produced in Ohio." Id. at
271. New Energy Company manufactured ethanol in Indiana, a state which had
repealed its tax exemption for ethanol. See id. at 272. Consequently, because of
Ohio's reciprocity provision, New Energy Company was ineligible to receive the
Ohio tax credits. See id. at 272-73. Appellees argued that the provision should not
be considered burdensome to interstate commerce because its practical scope was
limited. See id. 276. Appellees pointed out that there was only one ethanol manu-
facturer in Ohio and the only out-of-state manufacturer that was burdened was
New Energy Company. See id. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that "[o]ur
cases, however, indicate that where discrimination is patent, as it is here, neither a
widespread disadvantage to in-state interests nor a widespread disadvantage to out-
of-state competitors need be shown." Id.
182. See id. at 276-77 (stating that "[v]arying the strength of the bar against
economic protectionism according to the size and number of in-state and out-of-
state firms affected would serve no purpose except the creation of new uncertain-
ties in an already complex field").
183. See Houlton, 175 F.3d at 188 (stating that "even self-haulers are required
to use a designated transfer station" therefore creating forced business transac-
tions). For an overview of the 1997 Ordinance, see supra notes 36-41 and accompa-
nying text.
184. SeeC & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994);
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1950).
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In Carbone, this economic effect was enough to receive Commerce
Clause coverage. 185 The Court held that "[i] t is well settled that ac-
tions are within the domain of the Commerce Clause if they burden
interstate commerce or impede its free flow."18 6
Moreover, under a "market participation" analysis, the 1997
Ordinance violates the dormant Commerce Clause) 87 Houlton
would not qualify as a "market participant" because the 1997 Ordi-
nance imposes fines and penalties against Houlton's non-compliant
self-haulers. 18 8 These criminal sanctions imposed by the Town are
ones that a private party could not undertake on its own.1 89 This
characteristic is a requirement for classification as a "market partici-
pant" and, consequently, Houlton would be classified as a "market
regulator."190 Therefore, the First Circuit's decision in Houlton may
be subject to criticism for the discriminatory effect it has on this
small portion of Houlton's economy.
VI. IMPACT
The First Circuit's decision in Houlton may have a substantial
impact upon the judicial landscape. First, district courts may now
use Houlton as precedent in analyzing future dormant Commerce
Clause analysis. This will limit the discretion lower district courts
employ when addressing a dormant Commerce Clause issue. Tradi-
tional dormant Commerce Clause analysis requires a court to first
ask the question of whether or not the flow control ordinance was
discriminatory in purpose or effect. 191 If the answer is yes, then the
flow control ordinance will be stricken down as unconstitutional.192
If the answer is no, then the Pike balancing test will be applied.19 3
After Houlton, however, district courts and other circuit courts who
adopt Houlton's line of reasoning will begin their dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis with the question of whether or not the
185. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 389.
186. Id.
187. For a discussion of the "market participation" analysis, see supra text ac-
companying notes 187-93.
188. See id.; see also Houlton, 175 F.3d at 182.
189. See SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown, 66 F.3d 502, 510 (1992); Wyoming
v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992).
190. See SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 510.
191. For a discussion of the traditional dormant Commerce Clause analysis,
see supra text accompanying notes 55-68.
192. See generally C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); Fort Gratiot Sanitary v.
Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992); City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
193. For a discussion of the Pike balancing text, see supra text accompanying
notes 63-65.
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HOULTON
town's bidding process was "open and competitive," thereby avoid-
ing Supreme Court precedent altogether. 9 4 This novel approach
could lead to more confusion in this area of constitutional law be-
cause courts disagreeing with Carbone's strict scrutiny analysis could
bypass it by adopting Houlton's line of reasoning. As such, when a
dormant Commerce Clause issue arises in federal court, a split of
authority may result.
As a practical result of Houlton, a town council trying to charac-
terize its flow control ordinance as constitutional under the dor-
mant Commerce Clause must be aware that Houlton's holding is
applicable to the narrow set of cases where an open and competi-
tive bidding process, not the ordinance, assigns the disposal site.1 95
Consequently, if a town's ordinance mandates a disposal site but
does not allow for outside bids, most courts will be unable to utilize
the Houlton rationale to uphold the ordinance.1 96
However, if a court finds the town's selection process open
and competitive, a court can use the Houlton reasoning to uphold
the ordinance, thus positively affecting a community. Politically, the
Houlton decision helps eliminate confusion by instructing local poli-
ticians on how to draft effective flow control legislation. 197 As long
as the proposed flow control ordinance has provisions that allow for
an "open and competitive" bidding process, a court relying on
Houlton will likely not overturn the ordinance in the future.19 8 Lo-
cal governments, as a result, will be less hesitant and more inclined
to go forth with new plans for waste removal and processing. 199 Eco-
nomically, Houlton will alleviate a town's concern about unfulfilled
194. For a discussion of the "open and competitive" bidding process, see
supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
195. For a discussion of the distinction between post-Carbone cases in which
ordinances have been deemed per se unconstitutional because of a designated dis-
posal site in the local ordinance and those cases where there has been an open and
competitive selection process, see supra text accompanying notes 167-73.
196. See John Turner, Article: The Flow Control of Solid Waste and the Commerce
Clause: Carbone and Its Progeny, 7 VILL. ENV-rL. L.J. 203, 231 (1996) (noting most
post-Carbone cases have involved mandated facility sites without any selection pro-
cess and therefore courts will rule ordinance per se invalid under dormant Com-
merce Clause).
197. For a discussion of the rationale used in Houlton to uphold a flow control
ordinance, see supra text accompanying notes 138-41.
198. For a discussion of the "open and competitive" bidding process, see
supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
199. See Eric S. Petersen & David N. Abramovitz, Municipal Solid Waste Flow
Control in the Post-Carbone World, 22 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 361, 390 (1995) (asserting
local governments were unlikely to expand waste disposal systems until they are
confident flow control ordinances are lawful).
2000]
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waste quotas.200 Local program's that survive Houlton analysis can
now guarantee for the municipality the crucial supply of waste their
projects require. 20' As such, the fear of defaulting on debt pay-
ments is reduced dramatically.20 2 Furthermore, local politician's
can limit their economic liability from environmental suits brought
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA). 203 CERCLA imposes strict liability on
owners and operators of sites that have been effected by hazardous
waste "regardless of whether it can be shown that the municipality's
waste actually contained hazardous substances and regardless of
whether the municipality had determined the disposal site."20 4
Therefore, since Houlton allows flow control legislation that directs
a chosen operator to the town-owned waste site, the town can be in
a better position to screen out potentially hazardous waste, thereby
avoiding environmental and legal claims down the road.205
A self-hauler under a flow control ordinance similar to that in
Houlton's may be adversely affected. A self-hauler will have no
choice as to who processes their waste because the ordinance im-
poses criminal sanctions for failure to comply.20 6 Therefore, the
further existence of self-haulers under a Houlton-type ordinance is
questionable. Without a choice of disposal sites, a self-hauler won't
be able to shop around for better disposal rates. 20 7 Therefore, there
200. For a discussion of the relationship between waste quotas and govern-
mental interests, see supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text. See also Wolf, supra
note 1, at 537 (asserting that flow control legislation guarantees sufficient income
"to enable paying off the bonds necessary to finance the facility").
201. See Wolf, supra note 1, at 537-38 (contending that bonds needed to fi-
nance construction of waste disposal facilities are almost impossible to obtain with-
out guaranteeing stable source of revenue).
202. See id. at 538-39 (stating that "[i]t is obvious that assuring the financial
viability of waste facilities is the foremost objective sought by the users of flow con-
trol"); see also Wolf, supra note 13, at 268 (contending that flow control ordinances
make waste facilities attractive investments by "wipe[ing] out the risk and virtually
assur[ing] repayment").
203. See CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994)).
204. See Petersen & Abramovitz, supra note 184, at 368-69. CERCLA imposes
substantial liability on owners, operators, arrangers and transporters of hazardous
substances. See id. at 368. CERCLA provides for "liability, compensation, cleanup,
and emergency response for hazardous substances released into the environment
and the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste disposal sites." CERCLA, §??; 42
U.S.C. § ??.
205. See Petersen and Abramovitz, supra note 183, at 367-69. Flow control al-
lows governments to "protect the public and [avoid] substantial financial liability."
Id. at 369.
206. See Houlton, 175 F.3d at 182.
207. See Wolf, supra note 13, at 269 (stating that "[a]ll other things being
equal, people ordinarily seek the lowest price for a product").
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is littde benefit for a self-hauler to go through the time and expense
of self-hauling to X's site when X could come and dispose of it in-
stead. Either way, the final resting place of a self-hauler's waste will
still be at the town's chosen facility.
Finally, the non-exclusive waste haulers or processors suffer the
worst after Houlton. If a town successfully proves to a court that its
selection process is open and competitive, processors and haulers
lose access to that market for the duration of the contract.208 Their
only option is to wait until the next open bid and hope that they are
the lowest bidder. As a result, processors and haulers may lose reve-
nue because they will have a decreased market share.20 9
VII. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Houlton court's rationale is too narrowly
focused. A flow control ordinance contains more than the selection
process. The first step in any traditional dormant Commerce Clause
analysis is to determine whether the ordinance is discriminatory in
its purpose or in its effect.2 1 0 In Houlton, the First Circuit ignored
the 1997 Ordinance's effect on interstate commerce. By doing so, it
bypassed dormant Commerce Clause analysis altogether. Whether
the United States Supreme Court will find this line of reasoning
convincing in the future is open to debate.
Even if the United States Supreme Court does not find Houlton
convincing, Houlton's value may lie in its political message rather
than as a judicial mandate. The First Circuit may be alerting Con-
gress that not every flow control ordinance that happens to have
some discriminatory effect on interstate commerce is per se uncon-
stitutional. In so doing, the court is inviting Congress to provide
municipalities the legislative tools to accomplish such schemes.
The First Circuit may have been influenced by Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Carbone in support of this view.211 There, Justice
O'Conner suggested that waste regulation problems could be
208. See Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of Chester, 68 F.3d 788, 809 (3d Cir.
1995). The Third Circuit held that a contract of 10 years in length was not unrea-
sonable given the construction and operation costs of waste facilities. See id. at
n.19.
209. See id. at 275. Waste control and disposal is a $63 billion dollar-a-year
industry. See id. As such, this industry opposes flow control ordinances because
they prevent or exclude companies from using alternative facilities that may be
cheaper. See id.
210. For a discussion of the traditional dormant Commerce Clause analysis,
see supra text accompanying notes 55-68.
211. SeeC & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 401-10 (1994).
2000] HOULTON 423
31
Barocas: Houlton Citizens' Coalition v. Town of Houlton: Is an Open and Co
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000
424 VILLANovA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XI: p. 393
solved by direct Congressional involvement.2 12 Congress has the
power to regulate interstate commerce, of which waste control is
included, under the Commerce Clause.2 13 However, as of the 10 5 h
Congress, no such specific regulations have been passed. 214 Conse-
quently, until Congress can agree on this issue, many of America's
growing waste disposal problems may never be solved.
Jason Barocas
212. See id.(stating that "[i]t is within Congress' power to authorize local im-
position of flow control. Should Congress revisit this area, and enact legislation
providing a clear indication that it intends States and localities to implement flow
control, we will, of course, defer to legislative judgement").
213. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3. For a discussion of Congress' power under
the Commerce Clause, see supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text; see also
Rachel D. Baker, Comment, C & A Carbone v. Clarkstown: A Wake-Up Call for the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 5 DuKE ENv. L & POL'Y F 67, 89 (1995) (stating that "Con-
gress may solve this problem, however, by quickly enacting specific legislation au-
thorizing localities to implement flow control ordinances").
214. SeeJames E. McCarthy, Solid Waste Issue in the 1059 Congress (visited Feb.
11, 2000) <http://www.cnie.org/nle/waste-16.html# 1_1>. McCarthy states:
Despite many common features in the interstate waste bills, there have
been some key differences in the House and Senate approaches to such
legislation. These differences, combined with the conflicting interests of
state and local governments and the opposition of some elements of the
waste management industry, have kept Congress from reaching
agreement.
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